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ARTICLES
CALIFORNIA PERSONAL INJURY STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS: THE MODERN TORT AND THE
JUDICIAL ABANDONMENT OF AN ARCHAIC
DOCTRINE
Steven J. Andre*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, California courts have disregarded statutes of limita-
tions as bars to personal injury suits when a plaintiff's injuries do
not appear until many years after the circumstances of injury occur.
Other principles regarding the doctrine of limitations of tort actions
are also showing signs of eroding in the face of judicial recognition of
modern realities.
The new view of statutes of limitations can be traced to indus-
trial development in the last century. Industrialization had two ma-
jor impacts upon the viability of statutes of limitations. First, it cre-
ated a new type of tort which does not manifest itself for extended
periods and is undeterminable with regard to origination. Second,
industrial development has also resulted in the rejection of a concept
of social equity which favors social progress over individual loss and
the acceptance of an equitable notion of corporate responsibility and
risk apportionment for costs of injuries.' However, this article fo-
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1. Generally, the process of industrialization has been regarded as contributing to the
evolution of tort theory beyond rudimentary notions of direct torts, such as battery, to negli-
gence concepts. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860,
at 85-99 (1977); E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 3-19 (1981); J. LIEBERMAN, THE Li-
TIGIOUS SOCIETY 34-39 (1981); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA.
L. REV. 359, 365 (1951) (crediting Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850), as the
first decision to set forth a consistent theory of liability for recovering damages for unintention-
ally caused harm).
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cuses its analysis on the post-industrialization development of tort
law which extends beyond negligence. One commentator has de-
scribed this development as a movement in social thinking from con-
tract to norms of fiduciary ethic which rejects the doctrine of caveat
emptor (buyer beware) and imposes more stringent duties on "those
who act."'
Case law in California has long treated statutes of limitations as
an equitable device, designed to prevent tort-feasors from being con-
fronted with remote claims.8 This has been the case in spite of the
fact that limitations periods are not designed with equity in mind,
inflexibly enforcing strict time limits.
Equity, however, is shaped and defined to conform to the exi-
gencies of the contemporary world.' Industrial development and the
series of transitions it has yielded have resulted in enhanced political
power wielded by a traditionally exploited underclass. The applica-
tion of the concepts of statutes of limitations has been transformed
into a flexible process searching for new analyses and straining to
find justifications to support new visions of equity in established tort
theory. A new perception of social justice has evolved, challenging
the arbitrary bars posed by statutes of limitations to compensation
for injury.
This article explores the California judiciary's reinterpretation
of statutes of limitations in personal injury suits. First, the history of
the modern industrial tort and its place in traditional concepts of
equity is described. Second, the judicial and legislative applications
of statutes of limitations to modern torts are compared. California's
three exceptions to statutes of limitations-the rule of discovery, es-
toppel, and equitable tolling-are analyzed. Last, the viability of
other proposed exceptions to limitations periods are discussed.
II. EQUITY AND THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL TORT
A. The Development of the Modern Tort
Changes in technology have yielded changes in torts.' The mod-
2. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 19.
3. Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 512, 535 P.2d 1161, 1167-68, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,
711-12 (1975); Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 25 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 153 P.2d 325, 326-27
(1944).
4. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 295-99, 317 (1973). Friedman de-
scribes how the legal system historically pays deference to those who wield the most power.
Thus, the laws reflect the goals and policies of those who are in control.
5. See Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Un-
certainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. REV. No. 3, 83, 86-87 (noting the difference
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ern industrial tort is distinguishable from the classic Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad' situation in two significant respects.
First, the cause of the injury is difficult to ascertain. In Pal-
sgraf, the source of Ms. Palsgraf's injury was easily traced to the
negligent conduct of an employee in assisting a firecracker toting
passenger onto a train. Compare Palsgraf to a situation in which a
mother is administered diethylstilbesterol (DES) and twenty-five
years later witnesses her female children develop cancer of the
uterus.7 The causation problems encountered in the latter situation
are much more complex.
Second, the modern tort is distinguished from torts of Cardozo's
time because of the the difficulty in proving that the injury occurred
simultaneously with the negligent conduct. There was nothing latent
about Ms. Palsgraf's injuries. She immediately realized that the
scales on the train platform were the source of her injury. Modern
technology, however, has provided numerous instances where the
cause and effect relationship is much less clear. Even the complicated
task of proving the delayed effects of a whiplash injury resulting
from a simple fender-bender pale in comparison with the burden
imposed upon cancer victims trying to prove that asbestos exposure,
which occurred fifteen years earlier, is the cause of their disease.'
1. Development of the Modern Tort in the Products Service
Area
In considering the modern tort, the reader should realize that
causation problems are not limited to situations involving products.
Technical advances in service areas, such as complex surgical tech-
niques, have also presented causation difficulties. Nevertheless, Cali-
fornia case law pertaining to statutes of limitations and the modern
between technology in the time of the nascent common law and modern technology: the num-
ber of persons potentially affected is greater, the mechanisms of injury are more unforeseeable
and unpredictable, and the injuries often involve long periods of exposure before they are
revealed).
6. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
7. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
8. See Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1016-17, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 726, 730-31 (1985) (holding that the extended statute of limitations for asbestos injuries
provided in California Civil Procedure Code section 340.2 applies to causes of action arising
before the law became effective in January 1980 because the Legislature was remedying the
inequities of applying statutes of limitations to gradually disabling injuries, and desired to
extend this remedy to as many persons as possible); Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir. 1975) (detailing the difficult problems of proof
involved in tying asbestos exposure to an injury).
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tort has developed primarily in the products field. One reason for
this is the dichotomy in liability theory drawn between products and
service situations.
In the products liability field, courts have allowed strict liability
of manufacturers of products because: "The purpose of such liability
is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves."'
The courts have refused to impose this burden of liability upon
services industries because service industries do not sell products, but
rather provide professional skills. This article consequently empha-
sizes analysis of products litigation.10
2. The Modern Tort: New Conceptions of Equity
Treatment of tort recovery by California courts has evolved
from a narrow view of compensation for tortious injury to an expan-
9. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
10. In Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187
(1971), the court noted that:
A hospital is not ordinarily engaged in the business of selling any of the prod-
ucts or equipment its [sic] uses in providing such services. The essence of the
relationship between a hospital and its patients does not relate essentially to any
product or piece of equipment it uses but to the professional services it provides.
Id. at 1027, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91.
On the basis of a legislative classification of pharmacists as service providers, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that a pharmacist who dispenses a prescription drug provides a ser-
vice, not a product. Therefore, the pharmacist is not strictly liable in tort for a defective drug.
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 679-81, 710 P.2d 247, 251-52, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 447, 451-52 (1985).
Another reason for the relative dearth of case law developing statutes of limitations in the
service area is that the California Legislature has severely restricted development of common
law analyses in particular service areas. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982)
(three year statute of limitations from date of discovery in suits against health care providers);
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982) (three year statute of limitations from date of
discovery in actions against attorneys for wrongful acts or omissions); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§ 337.1 (West 1982) (setting forth a limit of four years from completion for suits relating to
patent deficiencies in construction, design and planning of real property improvements). In
Martinez v. Traubner, 32 Cal. 3d 755, 758-59, 653 P.2d 1046, 1047-48, 187 Cal. Rptr. 251,
252-53 (1982), the California Supreme Court held that California Civil Procedure Code sec-
tion 337.15's ten year limit (providing a ten year statute of limitations for suits involving latent
deficiencies in real property improvements) does not apply to direct actions for personal injury.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982).
In contrast, the Legislature has been willing to extend statutes of limitations in particular
products areas. See CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340.2 (West Supp. 1982) (extending the time in
which an injured person is allowed to bring an action based on asbestos exposure).
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
sive perception of the right to compensation. This perception is
founded in equitable concepts of fairness acknowledging the con-
sumer's relative lack of knowledge, choice, and ability to absorb
losses from injuries. 1
In early industrial America, large enterprises were not abso-
lutely liable for tortious conduct. The injured were expected to bear
the economic costs of improvements. Gradually, however, the no-lia-
bility rule deteriorated as industry expanded and prospered." How-
ever, even before this stage of corporate development was reached,
forces were at work to undermine the legal developments which pro-
tected infant American industry at the expense of the injured. Thus,
it was noted: "The no-liability rule could not last. . . . We reject
the rule of caveat emptor because its essential prerequi-
site-knowledge of risk-cannot plausibly be maintained. The ordi-
nary consumer does not and cannot understand the engineering and
safety aspects of most modern goods. The world is too intricate."'"
Today, industrial organizations have grown enormously in
power as well as size. The position of large corporations in America
has required corporate assumption of responsibility for community
welfare.' The attainment of a secure position by manufacturing cor-
porations marked the total reversal of the equitable notion that indi-
viduals should bear the burdens of injuries. Equity now requires the
financially secure corporate entity to absorb the losses involved in
compensating a person injured by its product, and to allocate this
loss to other consumers in the form of higher prices." The following
sections describe how this has been reflected in developments in stat-
utes of limitations.
III. THE IDEAL AND THE REALITY OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
Courts regard limitations periods as designed to prevent unfair
surprise to defendants who are confronted by claims which
11. Morton Horwitz detailed how courts altered legal rules in order to subsidize the
enterprises of industrialists. He noted: "By the time of the Civil War . . . American courts
had created a variety of legal doctrines whose primary effect was to force those injured by
economic activities to bear the cost of these improvements." M. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 70-
71; C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 38-39, 233 (1975).
12. C. STONE, supra note 11, at 233.
13. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 39.
14. A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 166-67 (1954).
15. E.g., Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
1987]
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originated in the distant past.' A review of the relevant statutory
scheme reveals no support for this equitable principle, however, Cal-
ifornia Civil Procedure Code section 312 states: "Civil actions, with-
out exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed
in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless
where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by
statute.
''17
Thus, an action can only be commenced within the statutorily
prescribed period. Under California's Civil Procedure section 350,
"[a]n action is commenced, within the meaning of this title, when the
complaint is filed."' 8 A statute of limitations in an action is tolled
when the complaint is filed. Assuming the language of section 350 is
exclusive of any other means of tolling the statute of limitations and
refers to the filing of a complaint in a court," a defendant who is
served the same day a complaint for negligence is filed-one year
and two days after an auto accident-may successfully assert the
statute of limitations provided by California's Civil Procedure section
340(3)20 as a bar to the action.
At the same time, California Civil Procedure Code section
583.21021 provides a three year period in which an injured person
may serve a defendant with a complaint. This means an action can
be commenced three days earlier by filing a complaint in the same
auto accident case within the one year period. The complaint can
then be served on a defendant almost four years after the accident
occurred.22
California Civil Procedure Code section 583.24023 provides for
an additional two year discretionary exception which, unlike section
312, would allow extension of the three year limit where circum-
16. Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696,
701 (1977).
17. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982).
18. Id. at § 350.
19. See Bold v. Board of Medical Examiners, 133 Cal. App. 23, 25, 23 P.2d 826, 826-
27 (1933); CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 411.10 (West 1973).
20. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 340(3) (West Supp. 1987) (one year statute of
limitations).
21. Id. at § 583.210.
22. Given the realities of modern tort litigation, in many cases one year may not
provide an injured plaintiff sufficient time to identify and locate all potential
defendants. This is especially true in products liability cases. . . .By effectively
extending the statutes of limitations by use of fictitious defendant provisions,
sections 474 and 583.210 help to mitigate the harshness of the one-year limita-
tions period prescribed by section 340(3).
Brennan v. Lermer Corp., 626 F. Supp. 926, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
23. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 583.240 (West Supp. 1987).
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stances beyond a plaintiff's control prevent effective service."'
How the act of filing a document with the court, rather than
actual service, can better serve the objective of avoiding unfair sur-
prise to defendants escapes reason. It is not realistic to expect that
the average citizen would travel to the courthouse on a regular basis
to see if any tort claims have been filed against him or her. Never-
theless, this manifestation of legal schizophrenia persists to the pre-
sent day.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE MODERN TORT
The California Legislature views the role of statutes of limita-
tions differently thaiPthe judiciary. The courts apply statutes of limi-
tations to prevent unfairness to defendants and avoid finding excep-
tions to limitations periods based upon unfairness to plaintiffs.
In contrast, legislative exceptions focus upon unfairness to
plaintiffs withodt regard to unfairness which defendants suffer due
to an exception.2 ' However, legislative enactments manifest a distaste
24. Delay of notice to a defendant may be drawn out even further. California Civil
Procedure Code section 474 allows an injured person, who cannot identify a defendant or the
facts supporting the cause of action, to file a complaint, and to later amend the complaint to
identify the defendant. In Barrington v. A.H. Robins, Co., 39 Cal. 3d 146, 702 P.2d 563, 216
Cal. Rptr. 405 (1986), the California Supreme Court held that the three year limitations
period does not commence to run at the time the original complaint is filed as to a Doe defend-
ant. In such a situation, the limitations period commences to run from the time of the filing of
an amended complaint identifying the defendant and alleging a theory involving new operative
facts. Id. at 154, 702 P.2d at 567, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
Thus, a plaintiff who files a complaint within the one year period in order to preserve his
or her cause of action, may amend it to add new allegations and defendants up to three years
after filing. The plaintiff then has an additional three years from the date of the amendment to
effect service. In all, seven years could elapse from the date of injury to the time a defendant is
served with a complaint. In this regard, the plaintiff is generally not required to exercise
diligence in ascertaining the cause of action or identifying a defendant. Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins.
Brokerage, 184 Cal. App. 3d 369, 375-76, 228 Cal. Rptr. 878, 882-83 (1986). But see Luti v.
Graco, Inc., 170 Cal. App. 3d 228, 215 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1985) (wherein the court upheld
dismissal of an action based on a presumption of prejudice to the defendant because of plain-
tiff's lack of diligence in not serving the defendant or providing him with actual notice of the
claim until almost three years from filing the complaint and almost four years from the date of
injury).
25. See CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 352 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987) (allowing extension of
the statutory period while a plaintiff is a minor, insane or imprisoned); Id. at § 352.5 (West
1982) (extending the time period while a defendant is under an order for restitution); Id. at §§
353, 353.5 (providing an extension when the plaintiff or defendant dies); Id. at § 353.1 (West
Supp. 1987) (extending the time period when a plaintiff's attorney's practice is assumed by the
state); Id. at § 354 (West 1982) (extending the time period when a plaintiff is unable to
commence an action due to the existence of a war); Id. at § 355 (West 1982) (providing an
extension where a plaintiff's judgment is reversed on appeal on procedural grounds unrelated
to the merits); and Id. at § 356 (allowing an extension where an action is stayed by injunction
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for the judicially adopted rule of discovery which lengthens the pe-
riod before which a limitations period will commence to run. With
the exception of California Civil Procedure Code section 340.2,26
which expands the limitations period for commencement of actions
for asbestos injuries, the legislative response to modern torts has con-
flicted with the judiciary's view.27
These recent legislative enactments represent a marked depar-
ture from past legislative attitudes toward the rule of discovery. In
the past, the Legislature has acted to overturn judicial rejection of a
delayed discovery analysis in a non-tort context. 8
The legislative reaction to recent court decisions is revealed in
the services area.2 ' In the construction and medical industries, for
example, the Legislature has diminished the time period allowed for
filing suit."° Thus, when compared to the judiciary's liberal interpre-
tations of statutes of limitations, recent legislative enactments re-
present a clear effort to limit such expansive rulings.
V. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE MODERN TORT;
CALIFORNIA'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
While the legislative perception of statutes of limitations is nar-
row, the judiciary has displayed considerable progress in liberalizing
its application of limitations periods to tort claims. California courts
have developed three exceptions to the statute of limitations as a bar
without exception"1 to commencement of modern tort actions. The
first, and most significant, is the rule of discovery. It relies on the
language of section 312, stating that an action must be commenced
or statutory prohibition).
26. Id. at § 340.2.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
28. In 1913, the Legislature effectively overruled the holding of Lattin v. Gillette, 95
Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892), by allowing postponement of accrual of a cause of action relating
to title searches until discovery of damage. See discussion in Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart and Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 183-84, 491 P.2d 421, 425, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841
(1971).
29. See CAL. CIV. PRioc. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982) (which as part of the MICRA
reform, provides a three year limit on the rule of discovery in suits against health care provid-
ers). Id. at § 340.6 (which provides a similar limit in suits against attorneys); Id. at § 337.1
(setting forth a limit of four years from completion for suits relating to patent deficiencies in
construction, design, and planning of real property improvements); Martinez, 32 Cal. 3d 755,
653 P.2d 1046, 187 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1982) (where the California Supreme Court held that
California Civil Procedure Code section 337.15 provides a similar ten year limit relating to
latent deficiencies in real property improvements, does not limit direct actions for personal
injury).
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 312 (West 1982).
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within the prescribed period "after the cause of action shall have
accrued." 82 Where discovery of a cause of action is delayed in spite
of a plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence," the cause of action
has actually not yet accrued. If the cause of action is nonexistent, a
defendant cannot be accused of prejudicing the plaintiff's discovery.
The second and third exceptions focus upon the defendant's
knowledge and conduct. The second is an estoppel concept. This ex-
ception focuses upon a defendant's conduct in preventing a plaintiff
from commencing an action within the statutory period. The final
exception, known as equitable tolling, tolls the statute if a defendant
knows of a plaintiff's claim, has engaged in discovery, and has not
been disadvantaged by plaintiff's good faith delay.34
A. The Rule of Discovery
The first major development in California law to deal with the
inequities produced by a strict application of statutes of limitations
was the acceptance of a rule of discovery. The general rule was that
a cause of action accrued as soon as all elements of a tort were
clearly evident. Thus, accrual depended entirely upon a defendant's
actions, disregarding a plaintiff's awareness of this conduct." Obvi-
ous difficulty exists in applying such a rule to situations involving
product defects or hazardous work environments. In the first situa-
tion, the defendant's wrongful conduct may occur years before in-
jury. 6 In the second, a lengthy period of time involving many expo-
sures makes it impossible to determine when the tort occurred."
Currently, the accepted rule is that a cause of action accrues
when a plaintiff discovers all of the elements of the cause of action. 8
Rather than commencing the statutory period from the date of the
defendant's harmful conduct, the courts find it more equitable to de-
32. Id.
33. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
35. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 351 (3d ed. 1985).
36. For a case where the court applied the idea that a product's warranty is related to a
future event, see Firth v. Richter, 49 Cal. App. 545, 548-49, 196 P. 277, 278-79 (1920) (since
defendant warranted trees were Valencia orange trees, defendant implicitly warranted that
trees would bear Valencia oranges.).
37. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see also Marsh v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 217 Cal. 338, 351-52, 18 P.2d 933, 938-39 (1933) (accepting the point at which the
effects of a progressive disease become manifest as the time when the cause of action accrues).
38. See Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories, 171 Cal. App. 3d 376, 381, 217 Cal. Rptr.
313, 315-16 (1985); see generally O'Neal, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's
Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106 (1980).
1987)
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lay commencement of the statutory period until the injured person,
exercising reasonable diligence, discovered or should have discovered
the tortious conduct and the resulting injury.
Two components of the rule of discovery are delineated in Cali-
fornia case law. First, problems exist with determining when a
plaintiff was injured and discovered, or reasonably should have dis-
covered, the injury. Second, difficulties arise in ascertaining when a
reasonable individual would have discovered the source of injury.
The following discussion will illuminate why discovery of injury and
cause are logically antecedent to commencement of the statutory
period.
1. Ignorance of Any Injury
In Avner v. Longridge Estates,9 the court dealt with the appli-
cability of the three year property damage limitations period of Cali-
fornia Civil Procedure Code section 33840 to a situation of latent
construction defects. The court referred to what is hereinafter cited
as the general rule, stating that the cause of action arose at the time
of the injury, even if the plaintiff was unaware of its presence. 1
In reality, the general rule stated by the Avner court is nonexis-
tent. In fact, the court in Avner ignored the general rule it stated.
The court noted that where the plaintiffs fell within an exception to
the statute of limitations for continuing wrongs and damage is diffi-
cult to discover, the cause of action would not commence to run until
the date of discovery.' 2
Most cases which cite the general rule fail to provide support
for its application in the personal injury context.' Courts dealing
with situations in which the plaintiff is unaware of any injury, base
their decisions on analytic and factual considerations other than the
purported general rule as stated by the Avner court. The general
rule, as will be illustrated, was only applied in some cases involving
professional services and conversion."
39. 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
40. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 338 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). In Avner, the action
arose before the enactment of California Civil Procedure Code sections 337.1, 337.15.
41. Avner, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 616, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40. The Avner court's pro-
position that a cause of action arises at the time of the injury is hereinafter cited as the general
rule.
42. Id. at 617, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
43. See infra note 45.
44. At common law, significantly different considerations governed statutory periods re-
lating to property loss. For example, in relation to causes of action for adverse possession, it
has been stated that:
[Vol. 27
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2. Clarifying the Case law: the Fiction of the General Rule
Although the proposition that ignorance of injury does not toll
the statute of limitations is relied upon by the courts, the following
cases, which are often cited for the proposition, display that the rule
finds meager support in their analyses."'
[Adverse possession] has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for
his wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and dormant owner for sleeping
upon his rights; the great purpose is automatically to quiet all titles which are
openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and cor-
rect errors in conveyancing.
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135 (1918).
Furthermore, while adverse possession principles have not yet been applied to personal
property in California, in all property cases, the basic common law principle of repose of title
is inextricably tied to the basic statute of limitations principle of barring stale claims. See
Bufano v. City & County of San Francisco, 233 Cal. App. 2d 61, 70, 43 Cal. Rptr. 223, 229
(1965); 2 CAL. JuR. 3d Adverse Possession § 5 (1973).
The importance of protecting possessory interests is reflected in the fact that the actiona-
ble invasion of a property right can occur without any culpable mental state of the trespasser
or convertor. See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.2, at 762 (1952). See also Poggi v.
Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 375, 139 P. 815 (1914). Nor is knowledge by the true owner of invasion
of the property required to commence the statute running, since broad considerations outweigh
personal injury actions. See B. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 764 (1984). While the concern for reasonable and proper diligence in enforcement
of rights exists outside the property context, these broader reasons do not. E.g., Pashley, 25
Cal. 2d 226, 153 P.2d 325 (1944).
45. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954) involved a
plaintiff who suffered food poisoning from eating the defendant's canned peas. The court noted
that the discovery of injury was immediate (plaintiffs immediately became violently ill). Hence,
the question before the court was limited to whether ignorance of the cause of injury would toll
the running of the statute. Id. at 20, 266 P.2d at 164.
Collins v. Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 2d 451, 50 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1966) involved an
action for false imprisonment. The court was concerned primarily with determining when such
a cause of action would accrue. The court held that the statute began running before the
criminal action against plaintiff was resolved. Id. at 456, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The action
accrued at the time plaintiffs were released, since they knew at the moment of arrest both that
the police acted without warrant and that they had been deprived of liberty. Id. at 457, 50
Cal. Rptr. at 590-91. This holding is entirely consistent with a rule of delayed discovery.
Piazza Properties, Ltd. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 622, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 357 (1977), involved an action to recover monies paid in error and the statutory right of
recovery of such monies created by California Vehicle Code sections 42231 and 42232. The
court found that under these statutory authorizations for applications of refund, the concept of
accrual of plaintiffs cause of action under California Civil Procedure Code section 312 is
simply irrelevant.
Priola v. Paulino, 72 Cal. App. 3d 380, 140 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1977) involved a husband's
tardy effort to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. This was apparently spurred by
the recognition of a right to compensation for loss of consortium in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974). In Pirola, it was held
that "[t]he plaintiff ... is in no position to claim that there was no discovery of the wrong
that resulted in injuries to his wife which in turn led to his loss of consortium." 72 Cal. App.
3d at 388, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 190. In Pirola, the court pointed out that "[it is clear that the
husband's loss, although not recognized in this state as actionable at that time, was apparent
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Easton v. Geller," for example, supports a delayed discovery
rule. It involved a plaintiff suing for an accounting. The plaintiff
was attempting to resurrect a complaint after a demurrer on the ba-
sis that the bar of the statute of limitations was sustained without
leave to amend. Plaintiff's efforts to plead a delayed discovery were
rejected by the court which noted that the plaintiff could "not give
any reason why he did not obtain such information at an earlier
date." The court observed that from the facts alleged it "must pre-
sume that with reasonable diligence the plaintiff might have ascer-
tained the matters of which he now complains.""8 Thus, the court
implied that if the plaintiff had provided a valid reason for failing to
discover the wrongful acts of the defendants, he would have been
allowed to proceed.
Medley v. Hill49 involved an action against a sheriff for failure
to give proper notice of a lien sale of property purchased by plaintiff.
The court quoted the rule as stated in Lightner Mining Co. v.
Lane"' that, "mere ignorance of the existence of the injury com-
plained of . . .will not prevent the running of the statute of limita-
tions.""1 In holding against the plaintiff, however, the court stressed
the fact that more than two years before filing the plaintiff had actu-
ally discovered the questionable nature of his title to property due to
the sheriff's misconduct.52
Calabrese v. County of Monterey"3 involved an attorney who
was unable to locate the party indebted to his client for highway
construction work among the myriad of county and state government
agencies. There was no question relating to plaintiff's discovery of
the damage. The problem was that plaintiff's attorney had proceeded
against the wrong government agency.5'
on March 28, 1973. It was only a question of the degree of that loss that remained to be
discovered." Id. at 390, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
46. 116 Cal. App. 577, 3 P.2d 74 (1931).
47. Id. at 580, 3 P.2d at 76.
48. Id.
49. 104 Cal. App. 309, 285 P. 891 (1930).
50. 161 Cal. 689, 120 P. 771 (1911).
51. Medley, 104 Cal. App. at 311-12, 285 P. at 892-93. For a criticism of Lightner, see
infra text accompanying notes 59-63.
52. Medley, 104 Cal. App. at 312, 285 P. at 893.
53. 251 Cal. App. 2d 131, 59 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1967).
54. Id. at 135-36, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 227. Plaintiff advanced an estoppel theory, arguing
that the state was the county's agent and misadvised plaintiff regarding its principal so that the
county was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. The court rejected this argument.
Id. at 138-39, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 231-33. Plaintiff's claim might have survived had an equitable
tolling theory been available at that time. See, e.g., Collier v. City of Pasadena, 142 Cal. App.
3d 917, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1983).
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Similarly, Howe v. Pioneer Manufacturing Co.55 involved te-
nants who suffered injuries after their heating system leaked gas.
Although the court noted the general rule, 6 it concluded that the
rule of discovery allowed plaintiff's action.5" The court reasoned that
"if the plaintiff's allegations of lack of knowledge" were proven, then
they could not be accused of neglect in discovering their injuries.56
The only case which would possibly provide support to the gen-
eral rule is Lattin v. Gillette,5" which concerns an attorney's negli-
gence in conducting a title search. The court held that the cause of
action arose at the time of the negligent act, discounting the concept
that the accrual should be delayed until the plaintiff discovered the
errant title report.60
If, as the above cases demonstrate, California law provides no
valid support for the 'general rule,' then where did it come from?6'
It is this author's impression that the general rule was the misbegot-
ten child of the trespass case, Lightner.2 Lightner dealt with the
question of whether a trespass which was fraudulently concealed
would delay the running of the statutory period until discovery.6"
Before weighing the authorities and deciding that the statute should
be tolled until discovery," the court noted that:
It was the settled rule in actions at law that the plaintiff's mere
ignorance of the existence of the injury complained of, or of the
facts constituting such injury, or of the identity of the person
55. 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968).
56. Id. at 339-40, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
57. Id. at 341-48, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 623-26.
58. Id. at 346, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
59. 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892).
60. Id. See also Neel, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 183-84, 491 P.2d 421, 424-25, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
840-41 (1971) (discussing the lone exception to the delayed accrual of actions for professional
malpractice-legal malpractice cases).
61. No doubt intentional tort concepts, which generally do not lend themselves to deal-
ing with fact situations where injury and act were not simultaneous, played a role in determin-
ing how statutes of limitations would be applied to negligence actions. An exception is situa-
tions involving fraud. Statutory California Civil Procedure Code section 380(4) enacted in
1872 and judicial exceptions (Kane v. Cook, 8 Cal. 449 (1857)) evolved early to meet such
situations.
The more unlikely exception is in the hypothetical situation of the sleeping plaintiff who
suffers an unconsented touching or confinement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
18, 42 (1965); Prosser, False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 847 (1955); Note, A New Conception of Restraint in False Imprisonment, 68 U. PA. L.
REV. 360 (1919-20); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). In any event, the
problem did not arise until after the 1905 amendment of section 340.
62. 161 Cal. 689, 120 P. 771 (1911).
63. Id. at 696, 120 P. at 774.
64. Id. at 697-701, 120 P. at 775-76.
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liable therefore, until the period of limitation had passed, will
not prevent the running of the statute. This rule has been fol-
lowed in this state in several cases in which the point that there
was fraud involved in the cause of action itself; or a fraudulent
concealment thereof, was not raised or considered.6"
The statement in Lightner was dictum. It nevertheless spawned
a geometric progression of assertions of the concept that ignorance of
the injury will not toll the statute of limitations in subsequent case
law. However, as the previous cases demonstrate, there is no pub-
lished California opinion that lends any significant credence to the
existence of a general rule." It simply does not exist. Recognition of
this fact is long overdue.
3. Ignorance of the Extent of Injury
The impact of technological innovation on the nature of modern
injuries67 has presented new hurdles for injured persons attempting
to gain compensation within the statutory period.
Consider the situation of the would-be plaintiff who ignored a
cause of action for a minor discomfort manifested over a year earlier.
The same wrongful conduct which produced the minor injury may
also be the cause of a second injury which later results in a lifelong,
disabling injury." Thus, failure to file a lawsuit may invite disaster.
65. Id. at 696, 120 P. at 774.
66. The sole exception to this is in the bizarre treatment given in cases dealing with
legal malpractice. The unusual evolution of this rule in the legal malpractice context is traced
by the California Supreme Court in Neel, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1971). Justice Tobriner, writing for the court noted that "Itihe rule against delayed accrual
dates only from Griffith v: Zavlaris [a court of appeal decision] . . . and has never been the
subject of an express holding by this court." Id. at 191, 491 P.2d at 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
In Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971), the companion
case to Neel, the court held that a cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until
damage is suffered. Id. at 200-01, 491 P.2d at 437, 98 Cal. Rptr. 853.
Lower courts have not limited the implications of the Neel holding. A 1975 case, Allred v.
Bekins World Wide Services, Inc., 45 Cal. App. 3d 984, 120 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1975), involved a
moving firm's wrongful act in 1968. The cause of a serious rash-Bekin's negligence in pack-
ing belongings in urine and vermin contaminated straw-was discovered in 1970. The court
relied upon Budd and Neel and held that the statute was tolled "until the Allreds' sustained
damage and discovered or should have discovered their cause of action against Bekins." Id. at
987, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 316. See Frederick v. Calbio Pharmaceuticals, which states: "The rule
in malpractice cases . . . was merely a specific application of a more general rule determining
commencement of the statutory period .. " 89 Cal. App. 3d 49, 55-56, 152 Cal. Rptr. 292,
296 (1979). But see also Seelenfreund v. Terminex of Northern California, Inc., 84 Cal. App.
3d 133, 148 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1978) (applying fiduciary relationship analysis); Nelson v. A.H.
Robins Co., 515 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
67. See supra note I and accompanying text.
68. See Sonbergh v. MacQuarrie, 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 133 (1952).
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Conversely, a plaintiff who files suit and secures a small judgment
for lung ailments suffered as a consequence of fiberglass inhalation
may have problems when filing suit ten years later for cancer result-
ing from the same exposure."
Probably the greatest obstacle to allowing recovery in these situ-
ations is the difficulty in characterizing the later, more severe injuries
as separate. In Davies v. Krasna,7 0 the California Supreme Court
rejected an argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled
until the extent of total damages was determined.%
The court did conclude, however, that the statutory period
would commence to run at the point of "the infliction of appreciable
and actual harm, however uncertain in amount.""2 Depending upon
the interpretation of the term "appreciable," this may or may not
represent an improvement over the Howe v. Pioneer Manufacturing
Co.7 7 rule which stated that "when the fact of injury and the identity
of the party responsible for it are known, the failure to discover some
or most of the resulting damage until later will not toll the running
of the statute. 74
It could be argued that the suffering of minor discomfort does
not amount to an appreciable injury because nominal damages or
speculative harm are not sufficient to create a cause of action.75 Con-
sequently, it remains unclear whether a viable cause of action might
involve a minor injury which will not be deemed appreciable.
One approach is to argue that the earlier problems are distinct
from the later manifestation of injury and are different types of inju-
ries. This approach has received judicial approval,7 6 as well as dis-
approval. 77 Arguing that earlier problems were not sufficient to com-
mence the running of the statute conflicts with the established rule
that awareness of a slight injury which is transformed into a major
69. See Pereira v. Dow Chem. Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 865, 181 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1982)
(chemical exposure which caused temporary burns on plaintiff's legs later caused a permanent
severe kidney disorder).
70. 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535 P.2d 1161, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975).
71. Id. at 513-14, 535 P.2d at 1169, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
72. Id. at 514, 535 P.2d at 1169, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
73. 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968).
74. Id. at 340-41, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 623-24.
75. Budd, 6 Cal. 3d at 200, 491 P.2d at 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
76. See Zambrano v. Dorough, 179 Cal. App. 3d 169, 174, 224 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325
(1986) (wherein the court noted that plaintiff's loss of reproductive capacity involved a differ-
ent primary right and "is of a different type than the emotional distress she allegedly suf-
fered .. " Id.).
77. Sonbergh, 112 Cal. App. 2d 771, 247 P.2d 143 (1952).
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injury, will commence running of the statute of limitations.7 8
The leading case confronting this area of statutes of limitations
analysis is Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 79 The
plaintiff used a drug, MER/29, in 1960 and discontinued use when
he detected eye problems and dermatitis. These conditions disap-
peared when he stopped using the drug, after developing cataracts.
The court decided that defendants' motion for summary judgment
should fail, indicating that since causation was disputed, it could not
be argued plaintiff knew of the cause of his injury in 1960. Thus,
plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until it was established that
his problems were caused by the drug.80
The court relied upon several factors in determining whether
the plaintiffs knowledge that his 1960 injuries were caused by the
drug would bar his action.81 It noted: (1) the difficulty plaintiff
would have encountered had he attempted to establish the cause of
his cataracts in 1960;8' (2) the judiciary's recent trend of recognizing
the practical needs of plaintiffs suffering from delayed injuries;8" and
(3) the miscarriage of justice that would result if the plaintiff was
not allowed to go to trial.84
In the face of the novel risks and mechanisms of injury
presented by modern technology, the facts presented in Martinez-
Ferrer are likely to become less peculiar. No doubt further judicial
78. Priola, 72 Cal. App. 3d 380, 140 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1977); Calvin v. Thayer, 150 Cal.
App. 2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1957).
This theory does, however, enjoy some support in the worker's compensation, creeping
disease cases. See Coots v. Southern Pac. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 805, 322 P.2d 460 (1958); Marsh,
217 Cal. at 351-52, 18 P.2d at 938-39. However, courts have remained reluctant to extend this
support beyond the worker's compensation context. See Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 886, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (1979) (stating: "We assume that
the Supreme court in Coots meant what it said about the general inapplicability of a disability
standard to ordinary tort actions .... " Id.).
79. 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (1980).
80. Id. at 320-21, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 594. Taken to its extreme, this analysis would
result in the statutory period failing to commence running until a jury brought in a verdict
determining causation against the defendant. This problem is probed further in the following
section.
81. Id. at 320, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
82. Id. at 323-24, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. The court stated: "The simple fact is that
rules developed against the relatively unsophisticated backdrops of barroom brawls, intersec-
tion collisions and slips and falls lose some of their relevance in these days of miracle drugs
with their wondrous, unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed side effects." Id.
at 323-24, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
83. Id. at 325, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
84. The court then held: "We make no attempt to even summarize where all of this may
lead. We are, however, convinced that under the peculiar circumstances of this case it would be
a miscarriage of justice not to permit plaintiff to go to trial." Id. at 327, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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elaboration of the considerations and conclusions of Martinez-Ferrer
will be forthcoming.
4. Discovery of the Cause of Action
That a plaintiff's awareness of the cause of injury is a prerequi-
site to the running of the statutory period was first developed in the
areas of worker's compensation85 and medical malpractice.86
The earlier judicial decisions reflected an unwillingness to rec-
ognize that a plaintiff could suffer an injury and not recognize its
source. The court in Rubino v. Utah Canning Co.,8 for example,
refused to apply the discovery principle where plaintiffs became vio-
lently ill immediately after eating canned peas, but did not recognize
the product as the source of injury until years later.
Where the discovery principle was applied, it was limited by
the rationale that plaintiff's diligence was diminished in the worker's
compensation context by the nature of the Compensation Act, which
had as its purpose the protection of workers.88 Similarly, when the
discovery principle was applied in the malpractice context, it was
limited by the fiduciary nature of the relationship involved.89
In modern times, the running of the statute will be tolled if
plaintiffs exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the injury.
Controversy surrounds the boundaries of a plaintiffis duty to exercise
diligence in investigating his injuries. Courts tend to interpret the
term diligence as meaning that a plaintiff assumes an enhanced obli-
gation-greater than that imposed on the reasonable person in such
circumstances-to search for the cause of injury.
The meaning of diligence was first evaluated by the California
Supreme Court in a fraud action, Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co.90
The court rejected the idea that the plaintiff had the burden of prov-
ing diligence in discovering the injury. The court held:
Where there is a duty to investigate, the plaintiff may be
charged with knowledge of the facts which would have been dis-
85. Marsh, 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933).
86. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
87. 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P.2d 163 (1954).
88. See Marsh, 217 Cal. at 345-46, 18 P.2d at 936.
89. See, e.g., Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 97, 102, 533 P.2d 1129,
1132, 1135, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657, 660, 663 (1976) (describing the rationale for the judicially
adopted exception and the application to other professional relationships).
90. 26 Cal. 2d 412, 436-44, 159 P.2d 958, 971-75 (1945). "Defendants assert that in
addition to these requirements plaintiff must show that he made a diligent inquiry to . . .
discover whether or not he had been defrauded. ... Id. at 437, 159 P.2d at 972.
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closed by an investigation; but where, as here, there is no prior
duty to investigate, the statute does not run until he has notice
or knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on
inquiry .... 91
Although the Hobart court enunciated a reasonable man stan-
dard for showing "diligence," many lower courts have insisted upon
reading a different meaning into the term. One court, for example,
required an enhanced duty to investigate on the part of the
plaintiff.92
A recent case illustrates the difficulty courts have encountered in
defining this term. In Snow v. A.H. Robins Company, Inc.," the
plaintiff was aware that the defendant's IUD failed to prevent her
pregnancy. The plaintiff chose to terminate the 1974 pregnancy with
an abortion. She understood when the IUD was inserted in 1973,
however, that it was not foolproof, that pregnancy was possible and
that use of the IUD entailed a pregnancy rate of one or two per-
cent.94 After viewing an expose' concerning defendant's wrongful
concealment of higher pregnancy rates, plaintiff filed suit within one
year. Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in discovering her injuries."
The court in Snow reasoned that an unexpected injury should
place a plaintiff on notice to sue. Since there were no warnings that
an abortion might be medically necessary as the result of using the
IUD, it was an "unusual enough circumstance to put her on notice
that the IUD was either defective or not safe."' 6
The first problem with this reasoning is that it does not fit the
facts. The choice of an abortion to terminate her pregnancy was the
plaintiff's only means of dealing with the injury of pregnancy. It is
doubtful whether a pregnancy can be considered unusual enough to
place one on notice. Second, even if plaintiff's pregnancy was un-
usual, the assumption that plaintiff should have then been required
to investigate the cause of her injury for wrongful conduct is unwar-
ranted. The rule, as stated in Hobart, is otherwise. The mere fact
91. Id. at 442, 159 P.2d at 974; see also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 52 Cal. App. 3d
118, 125-31, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 64-69 (1975).
92. See Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 321, 157 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979).
The court stated that "a person who claims that the statute of limitations is suspended because
of someone's fraudulent concealment has an independent duty to pursue an inquiry into the
cause of the injury with reasonable diligence." Id. at 332, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
93. 165 Cal. App. 3d 120, 211 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1985).
94. Id. at 126, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
95. Id. at 129-30, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 275-76.
96. Id.
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that means of discovery were available to plaintiff is not sufficient. A
reasonable person in Ms. Snow's situation would have been in no
position to suspect concealment of actual pregnancy rates merely be-
cause she became pregnant. At most, she would suspect that she was
among the unlucky one or two percent.
In another recent case, Kensinger v. Abbott Laboratories,9 a
court reached a different conclusion than the Snow court. Kensinger
involved a plaintiff who contracted cervical cancer as a result of her
mother's ingestion of DES while pregnant with plaintiff. Before
plaintiff reached majority in 1977, she had been treated for her inju-
ries and was informed in 1974 that DES was the cause. In 1980,
plaintiff became aware of wrongful conduct when she read in the
newspapers that DES victims had the right to sue for their injuries.
The court recognized that "a plaintiff may be aware of an in-
jury and its cause, while possessing no knowledge of facts indicating
wrongdoing by a particular defendant." 98 The court held that the
statute began to run only when plaintiff discovered, or should have
discovered, the drug manufacturer's wrongful conduct. Since the rec-
ord failed to show facts demonstrating as a matter of law plaintiff's
knowledge of wrongful conduct before 1980, summary judgment
against plaintiff could not be granted...
While the court in Kensinger stated the rule that "[r]easonable
diligence in discovering wrongful conduct . . . continues to be re-
quired . . . ,"'0 it attached a different meaning to the term dili-
gence. As in Hobart, the meaning was interpreted to require reason-
able conduct on the part of the plaintiff. In view of the difficulty in
applying, "diligence," perhaps it would be best to simply abandon it
and to adopt the more accurate reference of reasonableness.
Recognition that a personal injury claim accrues upon discovery
of all the elements of a cause of action is now accepted by the courts
as the majority rule. The decision in Kensinger and, in spite of the
inexact interpretation of the term diligence, the Snow decision are
the most recent affirmations of this rule. The concept of discovery of
a cause of action comprehends that a plaintiff should have reasona-
bly discovered that injury was the result of tortious conduct of an-
other, rather than accepting the injury as the unfortunate conse-
quence of chance.
Acceptance of this principle, however, is tantamount to a virtual
97. 171 Cal. App. 3d 376, 217 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1985).
98. Id. at 384, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
99. Id. at 386, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
100. Id.
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judicial emasculation of statutory limitations in cases involving ques-
tions of causation and product defect. This is the case where the
plaintiff's cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the
plaintiff should have known defendant's wrongful conduct was the
cause of injury. Obviously, a plaintiff cannot be charged with knowl-
edge of causation or wrongful conduct until a court has resolved
these issues.
This analysis can be illustrated by a product liability action
where accrual of a plaintiff's cause of action is that point in time
when a plaintiff is aware that a defective product is the cause of
injury. Whether a product caused the injury and its defective nature
are generally a subject of dispute in litigation. Since a plaintiff is
faced with the same problems of complexity posed to the jury for
determination by a mere preponderance of the evidence, then accrual
may not realistically occur until a jury delivers its verdict resolving
the issues of defectiveness and causation.
The test is that the discovery of facts, rather than legal theory,
determines accrual of a cause of action. 10' Knowledge of wrongful
conduct entails a discovery of facts. However, this assertion does not
apply to situations involving complex causation. The ordinary person
cannot be expected to recognize that a pregnancy was caused by an
IUD manufacturer's wrongful conduct, rather than the operation of
an anticipated risk factor.
Generally, the quandary presented by extending the discovery
principle to its logical conclusion has been avoided by the courts.
This has occurred through application of the requirement that facts
demonstrating a late discovery be pleaded with specificity. 2 Appli-
cation of this requirement has resulted in statutes of limitations chal-
lenges being determined on the face of the pleadings. In addition, the
courts have operated on the assumption that a plaintiff's belief re-
garding causation and wrongfulness is the same as knowledge of ac-
tual cause by wrongdoing. Thus, decisions are rendered on the rec-
ord presented for summary judgment on the basis of what a plaintiff
asserted was known in deposition or other testimony.' 0 3
101. Nelson, 515 F. Supp. 623, 626 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Davies, 14 Cal. 3d at 512, 535
P.2d at 1169, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
102. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1975).
103. See Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 321, 164
Cal. Rptr. 591, 593 (1980) (noting that a factual issue over the causation of injury prevented
the court from attributing knowledge of causation to the plaintiff); "Raul makes no claim that
his 1960 problems were caused by MER/29 and unless the record establishes without substan-
tial contradiction that they were, the summary judgment must be reversed whatever Raul
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If the ultimate determination is left to the trier of fact, the ques-
tion of when the plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the
wrongful cause of injury, where the defendant disputes causation
and defect, would likely be decided favorably for the plaintiff. This
is the case even where statutes of limitations issues are tried prior to
the main case. It may be desirable, in modern tort cases, to recognize
the difficulties in applying limitations periods and to simply abandon
statutes of limitations as a tired anachronism.
5. Summary: The Need For a Liberal Interpretation of the
Discovery Principle
Two special statutes of limitations problems are presented in
dealing with modern torts and the rule of discovery. First, there is a
problem with determining when a plaintiff has suffered an identifi-
able injury and is, thereby, placed on notice of the actionable injury.
Second, a difficulty exists in ascertaining when a reasonable individ-
ual would have discovered the source of injury."'
The increase in a need for a broad application of a discovery
principle has paralleled development of the technology which pro-
duced the modern tort. As was seen, the courts deemed Plaintiffs to
be on notice of a cause of action once they became aware of an in-
jury." 5 This conception reflects a judicial mind set developed in a
time of simpler torts. The idea was that awareness of one's injury
would serve as the motivation to look for another's wrongdoing as a
cause."0 6 This view utterly fails to recognize the practical problems
inherent in discovering modern torts.
In the first place, awareness of injury is no longer necessarily a
basis for suspecting wrongdoing, let alone cause. Feeling ill is hardly
going to cause an individual to check the home for an extraordinarily
high radon count. Second, even if the nature of the injury is such
that it is evident that some cause of injury may exist, the average
layman - especially when suffering from a disabling malady - lacks
knew or, rather, thought he knew at the time." Id.
104. A related practical problem for a plaintiff pleading a delayed discovery is that the
present insurance coverage of the defendant may not cover the injury. Illston, Insurance Cov-
erage and Toxic Torts: Who's Suing Whom?, TRIAL, October 1986, at 51; Gyler v. Mission
Insurance Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216, 514 P.2d 1219, 110 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1973).
105. Gray v. Reeves, 76 Cal. App. 3d 567, 142 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1977); Mock v. Santa
Monica Hosp., 187 Cal. App. 2d 57, 9 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1960).
106. It should be noted, however, that while courts have paid considerable lip-service to
this "general rule," it is extremely difficult to find case law which does not merely pay its
respects to this moribund doctrine in one breath, while finding exception to it in the next.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 112 (1954).
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the expertise needed to pinpoint that source and identify wrongdoing
out of a multitude of possible agents encountered in that individual's
daily life."'
The layman lacks the legal understanding to recognize either
that redress is available, or the means to secure redress. Thus, the
general rule of inflexible commencement of a cause of action upon
commission of the wrongful act has never been applied by the appel-
late courts in the personal injury context. The modern circumstances
and nature of injuries have rendered such analyses archaic.
B. Estoppel
In situations where fraud is involved in causing plaintiff's inju-
ries, the defendant may be estopped from asserting the statute of lim-
itations.' Estoppel reflects recognition of the gross inequality in the
bargaining positions of the injured person and the large corporate
entity specializing in the processing of claims.' 09
The estoppel doctrine is not limited to situations involving fraud
in the underlying tort. Consequently, a defendant's conduct inducing
a plaintiff not to file a complaint may estop a defendant from assert-
ing a statute of limitations as a defense."'
The doctrine has developed primarily in the context of worker's
compensation and insurance negotiations."' Both of these industries
have, of course, developed and become firmly established as essential
components of the modern personal injury compensation process.
Moreover, as is the case with determinations of the reasonable-
107. California State Bar Annual Meeting Seminar, "Pesticides: Litigation and Legisla-
tion," (Sept. 14, 1986).
Salinas attorney Bill Monning recently noted that many field workers injured by danger-
ous pesticides or improper pesticide use were, until recently, not pursuing legal avenues to deal
with resultant birth defects and serious illnesses because they failed to make the connection to
the apparently innocuous pesticide. They attributed the fact that tragedy had touched their
lives to the notion that God was punishing them.
108. Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120 P. 771 (1911).
109. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRAcT 65 (1974). Professor Gilmore describes
the rise in the last fifty years of concepts of promissory estoppel, unconscionability and quasi-
contract in the bargaining context.
110. The statement of this excuse for late filing given by the courts has been quite
broad. The California Supreme Court first gave expression to this doctrine in 1945. Benner v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 26 Cal. 2d 346, 159 P.2d 24 (1945).
111. For example, in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 115 Cal.
App. 2d 684, 252 P.2d 649 (1953), the court held that actual fraud in the technical sense, bad
faith, or an intent to mislead, are not essential to create such an estoppel. It is sufficient that
the debtor made representations or so conducted himself that he misled the creditor, who acted
thereon in good faith to the extent that he failed to commence action within the statutory
period. Id. at 690, 252 P.2d at 652-53.
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ness of plaintiff's conduct in the rule of discovery, the determination
of estoppel and the length of the estoppel is generally for the jury."1 2
However, once a defendant's conduct produces a delay resulting in
an estoppel, a "substantial period" following the defendant's conduct
is allowed for the estoppel to come to an end. The plaintiff is then
allowed a reasonable time to file after the estoppel expires."'
Certain conditions are prerequisites to an estoppel tolling the
statute of limitations: 1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of
the facts; 2) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of
facts, and the party to be estopped must have acted so that the other
party had a right to believe that the party intended its conduct to be
acted upon; and 3) the other party relied on the conduct to its
prejudice.""
1. Notice to the Defendant
The first condition to the creation of an estoppel, is that a de-
fendant is entitled to notice of a claim in order to prepare an ade-
quate defense."'
The amount of information about a claim which defendant
must be given is not clear. In Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Commission,"6 for example, the insurance carrier had
undertaken to secure medical reports" 7 and had interviewed the in-
jured claimant."'
Most likely a situation will not arise in which the two other
conditions required to effect an estoppel exist without the notice re-
quirement having already been satisfied. For example, a plaintiff
112. G. GILMORE, supra note 109, at 690.
113. Id. See also Van Hook v. Southern California Waiters Alliance, 158 Cal. App. 2d
556, 323 P.2d 212 (1958). It remains uncertain whether an estoppel has the same effect upon
tolling the statutory period as a defendant's absence from the state. The defendant's absence
extends the time for filing by the time of absence. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 351 (West
1982). It may be that an estoppel can only be found where a plaintiff is induced to delay filing
at a point in time when the statute is about to run. Id.
114. These conditions are set forth with approval by the California Supreme Court in
California Cigarette Concessions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 865, 869, 350 P.2d
715, 718, 3 Cal. Rptr. 675, 678 (1960) (dealing with a taxpayer's unsuccessful efforts to
secure return of overpaid taxes which involved reliance upon correspondence from the city
clerk advising the taxpayer's attorney to file suit to avoid the statute of limitations).
115. Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr.
696, 701 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has recognized the purpose of assuring
fairness to defendants through the complimentary aspects' of notice and repose. Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
116. 115 Cal. App. 2d 684, 252 P.2d 649 (1953).
117. Id. at 688, 252 P.2d at 651-52.
118. Id. at 686-87, 252 P.2d at 650-51.
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could not reasonably rely on a defendant's agent's conduct without
having first told the defendant about the lawsuit.
2. A Right to Believe in the Defendant's Conduct
In California Cigarette Con., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,1 ' the
California Supreme Court stated that among the conditions neces-
sary for an estoppel "the other party must be ignorant of the true
state of the facts [and] the party to be estopped must have intended
that its conduct be acted upon, or so act that the other party had a
right to believe that it was so intended. . . ."' The extent to which
a plaintiff must be ignorant of certain facts is unclear. The court
stated that it was significant that "[iun the present case there was no
showing of a state of facts known to defendant but unknown to
plaintiff. . . ."' Thus, the court implied that the reliance require-
ment was meant to apply to situations in which a plaintiff is igno-
rant of the pertinent statute of limitations.'22
The courts have been fairly generous in finding sufficient con-
duct by a defendant to allow a plaintiff's estoppel allegation to reach
a trier of fact. The court in Sumrall v. Cypress,' found defendant's
assertions that he desired to settle, coupled with a request that plain-
tiff delay in filing suit, were sufficient to allow plaintiff to invoke the
estoppel doctrine.
Perhaps the weakest set of facts found sufficient to satisfy the
estoppel requirements is found in Rupley v. Huntsman.24 The court
found the estoppel doctrine applicable when plaintiffs were delayed
by little more than an insurance agent's discussions and negotiations.
No representations were made that settlement would be obtained,
and no requests were made that plaintiff refrain from filing suit.
Defendant, however, did not deny his liability; nor did he request
119. 53 Cal. 2d 865, 350 P.2d 715, 3 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1960).
120. Id. at 869, 350 P.2d at 718, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
121. Id. at 870, 350 P.2d at 718, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
122. Id. at 870-71, 350 P.2d at 718-19, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79. See also Schaefer v.
Kerber, 105 Cal. App. 2d 645, 646, 234 P.2d 109, 109 (1951). But see Muroaka v Budget
Rent-A-Car, 160 Cal. App. 3d 107, 206 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1984) (where the reliance require-
ment was apparently abandoned).
123. 258 Cal. App. 2d 565, 65 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1968). Melvin Belli's client prevailed in
Benner v. Industrial Acci. Com., 26 Cal. 2d 346, 159 P.2d 24 (1945), where "the repeated
requests by the employer and the representative of the insurance carrier for 'more time' to
complete their medical investigation constituted conduct on which the claimant had a right to
rely and which should operate as an estoppel to the plea of the statute of limitations." Benner,
26 Cal. 2d at 349, 159 P.2d at 26.
124. 159 Cal. App. 2d 307, 324 P.2d 19 (1958).
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proof of loss. 2
Quite clearly, courts are prepared to recognize that a harsh in-
justice would result if, after the claimant and an insurance agent
have engaged in settlement negotiations, claims were barred because
the ministerial task of filing a complaint was not fulfilled. Thus, very
little evidence is required to allow a jury to find that an insurance
agent's conduct reasonably induced delay in filing suit.
3. Detrimental Reliance
The requirement of detrimental reliance was illustrated in
Isaacson v. City of Oakland.2 6 In that case, the plaintiff's attorney
did not realize that a new law had shortened the time required to
bring suit against a governmental entity to six months. In deciding
against the plaintiff, the court stated that the "[pilaintiff did not
withhold filing of his action because of a reliance upon conduct of
defendants. As determined by the court, it was because he, as well as
defendants, were under the impression that the pertinent statute of
limitations was one year.' 7 The court reasoned that plaintiff's er-
ror resulted from ignorance of the law, not from reliance on defend-
ants' statements.
The doctrine of estoppel represents a judicial recognition of the
potential for unfairness inherent in the modern system of processing
injured persons' claims. While some aspects of the doctrine are am-
biguous, an attorney dealing with a claimant acting in propria per-
sona should proceed cautiously when the limitations time draws
near.
C. Equitable Tolling
If more than one legal remedy applies to the same transaction
and against the same defendant, courts allow plaintiffs to pursue one
remedy, while tolling the statute on the other. 2 The purpose of the
equitable tolling doctrine, as stated by the California Supreme Court
125. Id. at 314, 324 P.2d at 23. See Jackson v. Andco Farms, Inc., 130 Cal. App. 3d
475, 181 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1982). See also Schaefer, 105 Cal. App. 2d at 646, 234 P.2d at 109
("[The defendant's insurance company informed the plaintiff that it was necessary to secure
the approval of the home office before the claim could be settled, and thereby caused the plain-
tiff to believe that the only question in dispute was the amount of the claim; the company told
the plaintiff that she would be informed as to the company's disposition of her claim." Id.).
126. 263 Cal. App. 2d 414, 69 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1968).
127. Id. at 419, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
128. Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal. 3d 410, 525 P.2d 81, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1974).
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in Addison v. State'29 is "to soften the harsh impact of technical
rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from hav-
ing a day in court." 30
The doctrine of equitable tolling developed out of an exception
to the statutes of limitations which allowed tolling of the statutory
period in circumstances where plaintiffs were required to exhaust
administrative procedures prior to filing a complaint on a single
cause of action. 1'
The courts have recognized three factors in deciding whether to
apply the doctrine: (1) timely notice to the defendant in filing the
first claim; (2) lack of prejudice to defendant in gathering evidence to
defend against the second claim; and (3) good faith and reasonable
conduct by the plaintiff in filing the second claim."3 2
The first and second factors are inextricably linked. The two
elements are essentially indistinguishable from the estoppel require-
ment that the defendant be apprised of the facts relating to a claim.
The court in Collier v. City of Pasadena' considered each factor
independently in holding that a plaintiff's pursuit of a worker's com-
pensation claim against a public entity employer would toll the pe-
riod for filing a disability pension claim against the city. When sev-
eral claims are similar, notice to defendant about one claim will
allow the defendant to prepare an adequate defense for the others.' 3 '
The third factor of good faith conduct is discussed in Mercury
129. 21 Cal. 3d 313, 578 P.2d 941, 146 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1978).
130. Id. at 316, 578 P.2d at 944, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The supreme court in Addison
held that this purpose did not conflict with that of a statute of limitations where defendants
suffered no prejudice in defending an action brought late in state court, where timely filing had
occurred in an action arising out of the same transaction in federal court, which was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
131. Elkins, 12 Cal. at 414-16, 525 P.2d at 84-85, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 644-45. The equi-
table tolling doctrine established in the 1970s has applied only to situations where more than
one legal remedy for the same transaction and against the same defendant could have been
pursued. Where an injured person pursued one avenue of redress, courts have allowed the
limitations period on a second to be tolled.
132. Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d 917, 924, 191 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
133. The court noted:
It is not altogether clear whether the Supreme Court would insist on all three
prerequisites. The policy rationale of Elkins and Addison suggests that in an
appropriate case a statute of limitations might be equitably tolled where only
the second prerequisite was fulfilled. But it is difficult to imagine a situation
where the defendant had a full opportunity to gather evidence relevant to the
second claim unless the other two prerequisites were satisfied.
Id. at 924 n.5, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 685 n.5.
134. Id. at 927, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
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Casualty Co. v. State Board of Equalization."5 That case consid-
ered a plaintiff's efforts to secure a refund of taxes erroneously col-
lected. The court held that plaintiff's checks marked under protest
did not constitute a claim because they were not specific enough.
Even if the checks were valid refund claims, plaintiff was disallowed
from pursuing that right in a second action because he had not acted
promptly after discovering that a right to a refund existed. 3
The requirement of good faith and reasonable conduct matches
the estoppel concern that a plaintiff file suit within a reasonable time
after expiration of the estoppel. 87
The purpose of the second element is met where a defendant
undertakes an investigation of a claim and the plaintiff has not initi-
ated court proceedings. It is not met where a defendant has an op-
portunity to engage in such investigation.' Certainly, a claimant's
conduct in hindering an investigation and in refusing to comply with
requests to provide discoverable information may operate against the
claimant on this element. Moreover, in light of the fact that actual
notice to a defendant-through service of a complaint-may not oc-
cur until a considerable time after filing of the complaint, 3 9 a de-
fendant may be better off conducting an investigation before a com-
plaint is filed and ultimately served.
The estoppel requirement which demands that a defendant be
apprised of the facts of a claim does not require commencement of
formal discovery. Therefore, note that estoppel addresses a different
underlying policy concern - that a defendant's wrongful conduct
should not be utilized as a defense. Equitable tolling operates where
there is no wrongful conduct by a defendant. Its concern is that a
defendant should be placed in a position adequately protected from
135. 179 Cal. App. 3d 34, 224 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1986).
136. Id. at 42-43, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 785-86. See also Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 926,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.
137. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that in Mer-
cury, the court's determination that the checks did not constitute a proper claim against the
public entity was considered with regard to the requirement that a claim for refund be filed
within six months. 179 Cal. App. 3d at 38-39, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84. It was not considered
relating to the equitable tolling elements of notice and lack of prejudice in gathering evidence.
It remains unclear exactly what sort of. evidence gathering must occur or be available to a
defendant to satisfactorily address these factors. The court in Collier seemed to assume that
formal discovery mechanisms must be available to a defendant in order to meet this prerequi-
site. Yet, neither the terms in which it is expressed nor the policy concern behind the second
element that a defendant be placed in a position to fairly defend appear to make this
mandatory. Elkins, 12 Cal. 3d at 417-18, 525 P.2d at 86-87, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.
138. An insurance company or person represented by an attorney may be in a far better
position to take steps to protect their positions than most laymen.
139. See generally supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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stale claims and deteriorated evidence. 4" Nevertheless, where there
is a lack of prejudice to a defendant it makes no sense to impose a
requirement that formal discovery mechanisms have been extant.
The logical conclusion is that if the commencement of formal
litigation is unnecessary, then there is no reason to limit the equita-
ble tolling concept to situations where two different claims may be
pursued and a legal claim has been filed with the state. Settlement
negotiations involving investigation between an injured person and
an insurance company would be sufficient to meet all of the equita-
ble tolling elements and concerns.
D. Judicial Rejection of a Fourth Proposed Exception
The focus of the three judicial exceptions described above is
upon prejudice to the defendant resulting from late filing. A recent
state supreme court decision has reaffirmed the rationale underlying
these exceptions by rejecting a fourth proposed exception. The court
in Gutierrez v. Mofid"' was faced with a third party's conduct
which did not delay discovery, but which had the same effect as
would a defendant's conduct under an estoppel theory: 4 it pre-
vented the plaintiff from filing suit.
An attorney incorrectly advised a client that she did not have a
malpractice cause of action against a doctor. Consequently, the client
did not pursue her action until after the statutory period had ex-
pired. 48 The focus of the proposed Gutierrez exception was not
upon the defendant, but upon the plaintiff who was prejudiced by
the conduct of the attorney. The estoppel requirements"14 are not
met in these facts. This is evident because the primary purpose"4 5 of
preventing surprises by providing notice to a defendant is not even
addressed.
Under the Gutierrez facts, holding in the plaintiff's favor would
have subjected the defendant to the same sort of prejudice which stat-
utes of limitations are designed to prevent."' The court distin-
guished the running of the statute of limitations in ordinary tort ac-
140. Collier, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 925, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 685-86.
141. 39 Cal. 3d 892, 705 P.2d 886, 218 Cal. Rptr 313 (1985). The court did not decide
whether reliance upon inaccurate legal advice might, in some circumstances involving exercise
of reasonable diligence inquiring into the source of injury, act to postpone discovery of a cause
of action.
142. See Carruth v. Fritch, 36 Cal. 2d 426, 224 P.2d 702 (1950).
143. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1986).
144. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
145. Elkins, 12 Cal. 3d at 417, 525 P.2d at 86, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
146. See Wood, 20 Cal. 3d at 362, 572 P.2d at 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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tions from certain instances where exceptions are made "because of
the need to balance 'the practical purpose that a statute of limitations
serves in our legal system' against the 'practical needs of prospective
plaintiffs.' 147 This rationale indicates the court's willingness to con-
sider unfairness to plaintiffs in applying statutes of limitations to
modern torts. However the court made certain that these concerns
were applicable only when they result in unfair treatment of a de-
fendant. The court noted that in the tort of malpractice, the rule of
discovery looks to the diminished "force of the defendant's argument
that he is entitled to the early protection of the statutory bar."' 48
The court delineated equitable considerations favoring the
plaintiff's position relating to the balance of knowledge between a
professional and a patient or client. The court noted, "the profes-
sional's fiduciary and confidential relationship with his client or pa-
tient both compels the professional to disclose, rather than conceal,
his error and mitigates the injured person's duty to discover it
independently." 4
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs proposed exception
to the statute of limitations and held that "the risk that discouraging
legal advice will lead to loss of a cause of action must fall upon the
plaintiff . . . rather than upon a wholly uninvolved defendant."' 0
Gutierrez, therefore, reasserts the purpose of statutes of limitations.
They exist to protect defendants from unfairness resulting from the
assertion of late claims; any unfairness which results to a plaintiff
from the plaintiff's tardiness is not to be considered.
In Lewis v. Superior Court,'5' a lower court accepted the ex-
ception rejected by the supreme court in Gutierrez, but under cir-
cumstances indicating a lack of prejudice to the defendant. In Lewis,
the third person causing plaintiff to delay filing suit was a driver
who hit plaintiff's attorney, leaving the attorney incapacitated and
unable to file the plaintiffs complaint within the applicable statutory
period. The court, in deriving an implied exception to the statute of
limitations, relied heavily upon the legislatively enacted exceptions
which emphasize fairness to plaintiffs.' The court also noted the
147. Gutierrez v. Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 899, 705 P.2d 886, 890, 218 Cal. Rptr. 313,
317 (1985).
148. Id.
149. Id. The rule of discovery was characterized by the court as an incentive to per-
formance of the professional's duty to disclose, since the professional would be unable to assert
the statute of limitations as a bar in a claim involving professional concealment.
150. Id. at 900, 705 P.2d at 890-91, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 319-20.
151. 175 Cal. App. 3d 366, 220 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1985).
152. Lewis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 366, 371-73, 220 Cal. Rptr. 594,
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judiciary's willingness to allow implied exceptions in the estoppel
and equitable tolling exceptions. These judicial exceptions have both
stressed the importance of avoiding prejudice to the defendant. Yet,
the court in Lewis made no effort to acknowledge this concern, in
spite of the fact that the existence of settlement negotiations probably
made this a relatively simple matter to address. 5
Lewis may mark the beginning of judicial application of equita-
ble concepts in finding exceptions to the statutes of limitations be-
yond the situation where a defendant suffers no prejudice. More
likely, in light of the contrary outcome of Gutierrez, it represents a
judicial unwillingness to apply the harsh consequences of limitations
periods where settlement negotiations have commenced and the filing
of a complaint would amount to no more than a formality.
E. Alleging a More Favorable Cause of Action
It may be possible for the plaintiff, confronted with a statute of
limitations which bars an action, to state facts and elements of an-
other cause of action which is not barred." This is not simply a
matter of stating allegations sufficient to support an action on an
alternative legal theory."" Current judicial analysis compels a court
to look beyond the form of the action in discerning the right sued
upon for determining the applicable statute of limitations.1 6"
Statutes of limitations are designed to prohibit actions involving
particular types of circumstances out of which damages arise. Rather
than restricting an entire common law right of recovery to a particu-
lar time period, statutes of limitations focus on fact situations falling
under the larger rubric of a common law theory. They are proce-
dural only, affecting the remedy, not the substantive right.157
A review of judicial decisions, however, reveals that the courts
frame their analysis in terms of concepts of tort or contract. 5 The
correlative of this tendency is a effort to adapt the facts to match
596-97 (1985).
153. Id. at 370, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
154. Each count must contain all factual allegations necessary to constitute a cause of
action. Hopkins v. Contra Costa County, 106 Cal. 566, 570, 39 P. 933, 934 (1895); Cameron
v. Ah Quong, 8 Cal. App. 310, 96 P. 1025 (1908); WITIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Plead-
ing § 323 (2d ed. 1971).
155. One problem may be the unavailability of or difficulty in obtaining acceptable rem-
edies on the alternative right of recovery.
156. Jefferson v. J.E. French Co., 54 Cal. 2d 717, 355 P.2d 643, 7 Cal. Rptr. 899
(1960).
157. See WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 224 (3d ed. 1985).
158. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 339(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
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common-law concepts, rather than assessing whether the specific
statutory provisions are applicable. The problem encountered is that
the modern tort often cannot be stated within the language of limita-
tions periods designed for common-law fact patterns.
Judicial myopia is particularly evident when the courts have
dealt with novel circumstances of damages which are not directly ad-
dressed by statutory language. For example, in Guess, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court,5" the court considered whether trade libel was covered
by the terms of section 340(3) or section 339(1). The court did not
consider, in applying section 339(1), that perhaps neither statute's
provisions controlled. The rule in applying statutes of limitations has
been that the courts will interpret such statutes to avoid depriving
plaintiffs of remedies. Courts also struggle to avoid a strained con-
struction and construe statutory limitations to allow a cause of ac-
tion.160 Nevertheless, in dealing with actions that draw from a range
of fertile legal theories, but lack a basis in particular statutory lan-
guage, courts are inclined to force such causes of action into pre-
existing statutory stereotypes. 6 '
The field of products liability is an area which provides illustra-
tions of analytic confusion resulting from efforts to apply a statute of
limitations beyond the specific terms of the statute. The courts have
applied the one year period of section 340(3) to product liability ac-
tions.162 Application of section 340(3) is based upon the determina-
tion that the actions sound in tort.
This analysis presupposes that under California Civil Proce-
dure Code section 340(3) all tort actions are subject to a one year
statute of limitations. Section 340(3) is not so extensive, however,
and on its face is concerned with actions involving personal injury,
forged checks and maltreatment of animals. It reads:
(3) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, seduction of a person below the age of legal consent, or
for injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another, or by a depositor against a bank for the
159. 176 Cal. App. 3d 473, 222 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1986).
160. Sevilla v. Stearns-Roger, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 608, 611, 161 Cal. Rptr. 700, 702
(1980); Pashley, 25 Cal. 2d at 228-29, 153 P.2d at 326-27.
161. The statutory scheme provides no directive impelling such judicial categorization.
On the contrary, the California Civil Procedure Code section 343 specifically provides for
application of a four year period for "actions not otherwise provided for." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 343 (West 1982).
162. Becker v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 794, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326
(1975) (holding that an action for personal injury caused by a leaking and defective gas tank
was essentially a tort action).
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payment of a forged or raised check, or a check that bears a
forged or unauthorized endorsement, or against any person who
boards or feeds an animal or fowl or who engages in the prac-
tice of veterinary medicine as defined in Section 4826 of the
Business and Professions Code, for such person's neglect result-
ing in injury or death to an animal or fowl in the course of
boarding or feeding such animal or fowl or in the course of the
practice of veterinary medicine on such animal or fowl.1"'
To argue that the entire scope of the term tort is encompassed
in the above provision is wrong. The California Legislature has es-
tablished different statutes of limitations for different types of tort.
For example, California Civil Procedure Code section 338164 pro-
vides a three year period for filing of actions based upon such torts
as fraud and injury to property. Therefore an action based in facts of
strict liability, without regard for the level of care a defendant exer-
cises, has no relation to the wrongful act or neglect covered by sec-
tion 340(3).1e5
In Voth v. Wasco Public Utility District,.. the court dealt with
a claim by farmers against a public utility from which they pur-
chased a product (water) to care for their crops. The crops were
damaged when the water was not suitable for irrigation. The court
distinguished Becker, and held that the action was essentially based
in contract. 67
The essence of Becker's relationship with Volkswagen was not
directly concerned with a warranty of the fitness of the gas tank for a
particular purpose. Becker bought the car for transportation. Pre-
sumably, it functioned in this capacity. Quite clearly, had the vehicle
163. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
164. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987).
165. See Rubino, 123 Cal. App. 2d at 22-23, 266 P.2d at 165-66 (considering the need
for negligence or wrongful conduct for the application of section 340(3)). The court in Voth v.
Wasco Public Util Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 353, 128 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1976) stated the accepted
judicial analysis employed in determining what cubbyhole to shove an action into:
Whether an action is contractual or tortious depends upon the nature of
the right sued upon, and not the form of the pleading or the relief demanded. If
the action is based on a breach of a promise, it is contractual; if it is based on a
breach of a noncontractual duty, it is a tort.
If the breach is both contractual and tortious, we must ascertain which
duty is the quintessence of the action. If it is unclear, courts generally will con-
sider the action to be in contract rather than in tort. However, if the action is
predicated on a duty independent of the contract, it will be deemed to be tort
regardless of the contractual relation of the parties.
Id. at 356-57, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
166. 56 Cal. App. 3d 353, 128 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1976).
167. Id. at 359-60, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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failed in this respect, Becker would have had an action for breach of
warranty. The gas tank defect and the damages resulting therefrom
did not constitute infringements of contract rights, but of personal
rights.
Conversely, in Voth, the defective product and consequent dam-
ages involved infringements of rights of a contractual nature. The
essence of the plaintiff's relationship with the defendant was con-
tractual: it was the nature of the defendant's warranty that its water
was fit for use on plaintiff's crops. This was exactly the manner in
which the warranty was not met.
A defective smoke detector, warranted and purchased to ensure
safety in the home provides a basis for an action in contract when
the device malfunctions and causes, or fails to warn of, a fire. If the
device had exploded in the consumer's face while installing it, the
consumer's action would fall under a tort theory of recovery."'
However, this understanding, while it reveals an approach to
distinguishing products liability cases sounding in contract from
those based in tort,' 6 does not reveal the more basic analytic flaw
employed by courts in determining applicable statutes of limitations.
When the court in Voth referred to "the quintessence of the action"
and "the nature of the right sued upon,"'' 0 it provided little assis-
tance in yielding a determination of an appropriate statute of limita-
tions. 7 ' At best, this method reveals whether an action is founded in
contract, tort, or both. It does little to advance the discernment of a
particular statute of limitations dealing with contract or tort actions
which should be applied to the particular facts of the case at bar.1 72
The courts have confused legal rights of recovery with the nar-
rower factual circumstances covered by statutes of limitations. An-
168. See Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 152 Cal. App. 3d 951, 958-60, 199
Cal. Rptr. 789, 795-96 (1984).
169. Two caveats to the practitioner regarding stating the ambiguous cause of action in
the form of "contract" are: (1) The warranty provisions of the Commercial Code eliminate the
rule of discovery; and (2) The contract cause of action may result in less favorable damages for
the plaintiff. See CAL. COM. CODE § 2725 (West Supp. 1987); Frazier v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 105-07, 214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 891-93 (1985);
170. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
171. In Voth, however, the particular statute concerned Government Code section 911.2,
making this approach an effective one.
172. A more accurate evaluation was undertaken in Sevilla, where the court dealt with
the question of whether an injury caused by a defective syrup pan at a sugar-processing plant
was due to a "product" under section 340(3) (subject to the rule of discovery) or an "improve-
ment of real property" under sections 337.1 and 337.15 (subject to a limit on the discovery
rule). 101 Cal. App. 3d at 608, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 700. In deciding for the plaintiff, the court
held that doubt must be resolved against a defendant in construing a technical statute of limita-
tions defense to avoid forfeiture of a plaintiff's just claim. Id. at 611, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
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other illustrative area in which this confusion is apparent is in insur-
ance bad faith litigation. The action for damages caused by an
insurer's failure to adhere to its implied duty and covenant of good
faith and fair dealing sounds in both contract and tort."' No statute
of limitations states a period for actions for breach of this duty.
The court in Richardson v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 7  dealt
with the appropriate statute of limitations in bad faith cases. The
court there again looked to "the nature of the right upon which
plaintiff is suing. '17'  The Richardson court felt that both contract
and tort actions against an insurer for bad faith are subject to the
two-year limitations period of section 339(1).171
The same analytic inadequacy exists in the approach taken in
Richardson that was seen in Voth. The essence of the action is not
tort or contract, but bad faith. Forcing it to fit into the language of
section 339, dealing with actions on unwritten contracts, is simply
impractical. Nevertheless, this is the judicial approach facing the
practitioner seeking to state a cause of action not barred by a statute
of limitations. Where the facts of a plaintiff's right of action cannot
be stated in a fashion which is clear - such that it could be either tort
or contract, allowing an election17 7 - a court may look beyond the
form of the allegations to the quintessence in applying an unfavora-
ble statute of limitations.
Consider California Civil Procedure Code section 340.5178 Sec-
tion 340.5 essentially bars actions "against a health care provider
based upon ...professional negligence . . ." brought after three
173. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1036,
108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 484 (1973); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 663,
328 P.2d 198, 206 (1958).
174. 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981).
175. Id. at 12, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 427. The court stated:
Courts have frequently been asked to choose between the one-year period of
section 340, subdivision 3, and the two-year period of section 339, subdivision 1.
The principle of selection which has emerged is that the one-year period applies
to all alleged infringements of personal rights, whereas the two-year period ap-
plies only to alleged infringements of property rights.
Id.
176. Id. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 428. See also Frazier, 169 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100-04,
214 Cal. Rptr. 883, 888-91 (1985) (indicating that the four year period of California Civil
Procedure Code section 337 should apply if the plaintiff elects to proceed on a contract theory
rather than tort); Umann v. Excess Ins. Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1532, 236 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1987)
(refusing to follow Frazier).
177. Regarding election of remedies, see generally L.B. Laboratories, Inc. v. Mitchell,
39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952).
178. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
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years where there is late discovery, except where tolled by fraud,
intentional concealment or the presence of a foreign object in the
plaintiff's body. Professional negligence is defined as negligence in
the rendering of licensed professional services. 179
It appears possible to avoid the legislative amputation of the
rule of discovery in certain fact situations by pleading the action as
an intentional tort. 80 For example, a cause of action for battery may
be established by characterizing the medical operation at issue as an
unconsented touching of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not informed
of the risks involved and was thus unable to give adequate consent.
Where discovery of the risk and injury occurred after the three year
period ran, but where an action was commenced within the one year
period of section 340, the action for battery should be allowed.'81
On the other hand, it may be that a court would regard the
failure to acquire informed consent, while not fraudulent and not an
act of intentional concealment, as an act of professional negligence
upon which the action is based.'
While pleading facts for an alternative cause of action sufficient
to withstand judicial scrutiny is not simply a matter of alleging the
requisite elements and appropriate damages, the possibility should
always be considered. The defendant, meanwhile, should scrutinize
the complaint to determine whether the essence of a plaintiff's cause
of action might more appropriately be categorized within the scope
of a shorter limitations period.
179. Id.
180. Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 651 P.2d 815, 186 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1982).
181. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980) (allowing the husband of medical malpractice victim to recover under a contract
theory for emotional distress). But see Mosely v. Abrams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 355, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 40 (1985) (rejecting application of California Civil Procedure Code section 337(1) -
limiting the time for actions on contracts in writing - in dealing with a construction defect
subject to California Civil Procedure Code section 337.15); Krebenios v. Lindauer, 175 Cal.
431, 432, 166 P. 17, 18 (1917); Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen, 119 Cal. App.
3d 433, 173 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (rejecting a contract theory in medical and attorney mal-
practice actions); and Tell v. Taylor, 191 Cal. App. 2d 266, 12 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1961) (re-
jecting a fraud theory in a medical malpractice action).
182. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). The
California Supreme Court in that case held that where no consent to the medical procedure
performed was given, a battery theory would apply. However, where permission is given for
performing a certain treatment procedure and a known, but "undisclosed inherent complica-
tion with a low probability occurs," liability would depend upon a negligence theory. Id. at
240, 502 P.2d at 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Post-industrial development has engendered both a new type of
tort and a new equitable conception of the relationship between vic-
tim and tort-feasor. Limitations periods in personal injury actions
have begun to develop to meet the challenges posed to the innocent
victim of the modern tort.
Statutes of limitations formulated in a time of simpler causation
and injury do not fit the modern tort. The judicial gymnastics per-
formed in attempting to make modern torts fit outdated statutory
concepts are simply untenable. In several respects, the courts have
recognized the need to expand the narrow common law interpreta-
tions of limitations periods. A modern tort plaintiff, faced with the
problem of ascertaining the wrongful cause of an injury, simply can-
not be expected to recognize many of the mysterious biochemical
mechanisms involved in producing certain injuries or the times and
places when such hidden mechanisms do their damage. Nor can a
modern tort victim be expected to anticipate that today's minor irri-
tation may disguise next decade's disabling injury.
Increasingly liberal interpretations of limitations periods are
necessary to meet the ineluctable growth in injury claims involving
latent injuries and complex causation. The judicially created discov-
ery rule allows the virtual abandonment of limitations periods where
causation is an issue. Developments in estoppel and equitable tolling
doctrines signal a judicial willingness to abandon imposing limita-
tions periods where notice of the details of a claim have been pro-
vided to a defendant through settlement negotiations or discovery in
related actions. Inadequacies in judicial efforts to constrain new or
hybrid torts to fit the language of common law limitations periods
may also result in the recognition that the fact patterns of a century
ago simply do not accommodate modern exigencies. The statutory
objective of limitations periods-providing fairness to plain-
tiffs-mandates this principle. The judicially perceived purpose-
avoiding prejudice to defendants-allows growth in this area of the
law to meet the modern age.
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